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FEDERAL CONTRACTOR'S STANDING TO SUE BEFORE AWARD
OF CONTRACT AND RELATED PROBLEMS
An ever increasing growth of the Federal Treasury has caused greater
emphasis to be placed on the importance of governmental patronage to
private industry., The quadrupling of the federal budget in the last two
decades has been accompanied by an increase in government procurement
expenditures from $9 billion in 1947 to $55 billion in 1970.2 This increased
spending has had immediate impact throughout private industry due to the
wide scope of the procurement process in obtaining items ranging from ballpoint pens 3 to military communications equipment.4
Administrative agencies must regulate this vast purchasing activity by
conforming the procurement process to relevant governmental regulations.5
Although most other administrative decisions are reviewable by the judicial
branch, the fear of tampering with the materials needed for the functioning
of the Government has, until recently,6 proscribed the courts from reviewing
certain matters pertaining to federal procurement.'
However, with the liberalization of the test for standing, a major roadblock to a disappointed bidder seeking judicial review of government procurement officers' action has been removed.8 This note will review the historical
development of standing in the procurement area, examine the changed
judicial attitude since 1970 and the problems arising from the new attitude,
and will offer some alternative solutions.
TRADITIONAL

CONCEPTS OF STANDING IN PROCUREMENT

PROCESSES

Until 1970 a bidder denied a government contract lacked standing to
prevent an award that was improper due to noncompliance with procurement

1. "[Wlhile in early times it was minor, today's distribution of largess is on a vast
imperial scale. .
. Many individuals and many more businesses enjoy public generosity
in the form of public contracts. Fifty billion dollars annually flows from the federal government in the form of defense spending. These contracts often resemble subsidies; it is virtually impossible to lose money on them. Businesses sometimes make the government their
principle source of income, and many 'free enterprises' are set up primarily to do business
with the government." Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. at 733, 735 (1962) [herein-

after cited as Reich].
2. Pierson, Standing To Seek Judicial Review of Government Contract Awards, 12 B. C.
IND. & Com. L. REv. 1, 5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Pierson].
3. E.g., Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
4. Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Resor, 12 Government Contractor ff413 (D.D.C.
1970).
5. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§2301-14 (1970); 41 U.S.C. §§251-60 (1970); 32 C.F.R. pts. 1-39
(1972). See also G. CUNEO, GOVERNMENT CONTRACrS HANDBOOK

6.
7.
(N.D.
8.

(1962).

See text accompanying notes 69-77 infra.
See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens, 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Lind v. Staats, 289 F. Supp. 182
Cal. 1970).
Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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laws and regulations.9 The United States Supreme Court held in Perkins v.
Lukens-0 that the Public Contracts Act" was not enacted for the protection
of sellers and conferred no enforceable rights upon them. Decided in the
heyday of the legal interest concept of standing,12 Lukens stood for the
proposition that neither damage nor loss of income was itself a source of legal

rights in the absence of a legislative recognition to the contrary. Noting the
executive discretion in the exercise of complete and final authority to make
government purchases, the Supreme Court stated:'3
[P]rospective bidders for contracts derive no enforceable rights against
the agent for an erroneous interpretation of the principal's authorization. The agent is responsible to the principal alone because his misconstruction violates no duty except that to his principal.
Accordingly, protesting contractors were denied standing to enforce the Labor

Secretary's responsibility to represent the public's interest in official compliance with the law.
The Court justified denial of contractor standing on the basis of public
policy, readily seeing delay, confusion, and disorder as incidental to allowing

judicial scrutiny.'4 To an extent the situation in Lukens confirmed this. 5
The Court further reasoned that if the law permitted disappointed bidders

and prospective contractors to challenge the determinations of the executive,
then affected employees should similarly be allowed judicial review. Thus,

procurement regulations were held not to bestow litigable rights, but merely
self-imposed restraints on government the violation of which provided no
basis for complaint by private litigants.
The Lukens rationale was harsh in many respects.' 6 While the Court
believed efficient procurement to be the overriding consideration, it failed
to appropriately consider the desirability of agencies conforming to their own

9. E.g., Lind v. Staats, 289 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
10. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
11. 41 U.S.C. §35 (1970).
12. "A plaintiff who seeks to challenge governmental action always has standing if a
legal right of the plaintiff is at stake. When a legal right is not at stake a plaintiff sometimes has standing and sometimes lacks standing.... [in the Lukens case] ... the statutory
provisions violated [by the Government] were not enacted for the protection of those who
were asserting the violation. That is why the companies in the Lukens case lacked a 'legal
right' on which standing could be based." 3 K. DAvis, ADMINSmATnw LAW TRAnSE §22.04
(1958).
13. 310 U.S. at 129.
14. Id. at 130.
15. By action of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit the Public
Contracts Act was made inoperative for more than a year. The Act provided the payment of
a minimum wage, set by the Secretary of Labor, to be paid to workers engaged in federal
procurement contracts. In effect the suit suspended payment of minimum wages to a large
sector of the American work force. Id. at 116, 117.
16. See O'Brien, The Joint Consolidated List of Debarred, Ineligible and Suspended
Contractors,7 A. F. JAG L. RFv, 22 (1965).
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regulations. 17 Furthermore, it was an erroneous assumption that judicial
non-interference is always conducive to efficiency and order. In fact, judicial
elimination of unmeritorious contractors who survive merely by political
patronage could, in the long run, decrease the delays and cost overruns caused
by ineptitude and inefficiency.18 Lukens was particularly harsh, however, on
contractors whose business consisted almost entirely of government contracts
and whose damage from improper awards could not be redressed in court1 9
Statutory Limitations to Lukens
During the Lukens era there were limited exceptions to the legal interest
concept of standing imposed through explicit statutory authorization by
Congress. 20 In FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station21 petitioner argued
that under the Communications Act 22 economic injury to a competitor did

not constitute grounds for refusing a broadcast license and thus respondent
was not an aggrieved person with standing to complain. The Supreme Court
disagreed, holding that the Act gave standing to respondents, since it explicitly
provided an appeal "by any other person aggrieved or whose interests are
adversely affected by any decision of the Commission granting or refusing an
application." 2 3 The Court stated that the purpose of the Act was not to
protect the licensee against competition but to protect the public interest.
This rationale was reaffirmed in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC.24 In

language that was to become familiar two decades later25 the Court referred
to those parties granted standing under the Communications Act as "representatives of the public interest."2 6
Summarizing the exception to the Lukens doctrine of standing, Associated
Industries v.

27
Ickes

held on the precedents of Sanders and Scripps that

persons aggrieved, seeking review under legislatively granted procedures,
need not demonstrate the standing ordinarily required in suits against public
officials:

17.

28

See Note, Rights of Unsuccessful Low Bidder on Government Contracts, 15 W. REs.

L. REv. 208 (1963).

18. See, e.g., Hearing on H. Res. 38 Before the Procurement Subcom. of the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1951 (case of Consolidation Indus., Inc.).
19. See note 16 supra.
20. E.g., Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1941); FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1939); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.),
vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
21. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
22. 47 U.S.C. §402 (1970).
23. 309 U.S. at 476-77.
24. 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
25. See text accompanying note 77 infra.
26. 316 U.S. at 14.
27. 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
28. Id. at 704.
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Where is nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress from empowering any person, official or not, to institute a proceeding involving such a controversy, even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the
public interest. Such persons; so authorized, are so to speak, private
Attorney Generals [sic].
Thus, it dearly appeared that the only exception to Lukens lay in finding
congressional authorization for review. In the absence of governmental violadon of a legal duty, the existence of such authorization became the crucial
29
factor to confer standing.
Continuing Vitality of Lukens
As late as 1962 the Lukens doctrine was upheld where a plaintiff alleged
that concessions were granted to another party in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. 30 The Fourth Circuit, relying upon Lukens, held there was no
standing to attack the award.81 In a later case, the court again enunciated
the principle that a disappointed bidder had no legal right to the contract
award.32 Since bidding was instituted solely for the benefit of the Government, this result followed even where the Government had violated its
bidding regulations. The policy of non-interference with procurement was
33
also a repeated justification for the result.
DEPARTURES FROM

Lukens-LoKING

FOR A WAY OUT

Tortious Interference
Friend v. Lee3 4 departed from Lukens by granting review of an administrative decision where plaintiff showed prima facie unreasonable restriction
of activity by the Government. Although the plaintiff attempted to obtain
standing by pleading governmental non-conformance with its regulations,
the court disposed of that issue by stating that such regulations were solely
for the benefit of the Government and conferred no rights on persons dealing

29. Finding such congressional authorization in the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §1491 (1970),
proved futile to disappointed bidders seeking review. Although the Act gave the Court of
Claims jurisdiction to render judgment on any claim founded on statutes or regulations of
executive agencies as well as contract express or implied in fact, only a successful bidder
who had received the award and entered into a contract could seek relief under the Act.
The disappointed bidder, however, was not able to utilize it as authorization to obtain
standing. For the latter, the contract needed for the suit was never deemed formed and
the procurement regulations were deemed as giving no rights to the bidder.
30. United States v. Gray Line Water Tours, 311 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1962).
31. Id.
32. American Elec. Co. v. United States, 270 F. Supp. 689 (D. Hawaii 1967).
33. Lind v. Staats, 289 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
34. 221 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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with it. Relief was granted, however, on the alternative ground of tortious
35
interference with plaintiff's business.
The question arises then, whether all cases of extreme disregard of regulations will give rise to tortious interference, thereby allowing the prospective
bidder a right to review. The Friend court relied upon the prima facie
arbitrariness of the Government in a regulatory action sufficient to threaten
substantial injury. Thus, there was no necessity to determine whether plaintiff
had standing under the Administrative Procedure Act. 36

Implied Contract for Good Faith Consideration of Bids
Gross abuse of governmental discretion has provided standing for prospective contractors where an implied contract with the bidder was found pursuant to the Tucker Act.3 7 In Heyer Products Co. v. United States, 8 for example,
the low bidder sued when the award was granted to a contractor whose bid
was twice that of the plaintiff. The court found that the Government, in
advertising for bids, entered into an implied contract with all bidders to
fairly consider those bids: "No person would have bid at all if he had known
that the cards were stacked against him."3 9 The plaintiff who alleges that
this contract was broken may sue for its breach- 0 However, the court limited
the damages for such breach to plaintiff's bid preparation costs and denied
him the opportunity to seek relief for lost profits because plaintiff, having
no right to the contract and failing to actually contract, suffered no damages
4
for anticipated profits. 1
Commentators viewed Heyer as implying that a disappointed bidder had

35. "We do not need to determine for the purposes of the instant case whether plaintiff
has standing to sue under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act .... We think
that the the plaintiff has made at least a prima facie showing that he is being subjected to
unreasonable restrictions. .... Such conduct on the part of Government officials, if it
actually has occurred, would be capricious and arbitrary. Where there is a threat of injury
resulting from capricious or arbitrary performance of the regulatory functions of a Government agency, the Federal courts have in a wide variety of situations been ready to grant
relief." Id. at 102.
36. "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
relief thereof." 5 U.S.C. §702 (1970).
37. E.g., Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970);Heyer Prods.
Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956). See note 29 supra. See generally Comment, An Expanded Cause of Action Under the Tucker Act for an Unsuccessful Bidder,
44 TEMP. L. Q. 552 (1971); Note, supra note 17.
38. 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
39. Id. at 412.
40. The plaintiff subsequently failed to sustain his allegations. Heyer Prods. Co. v.
United States, 177 F. Supp. 251 (Ct. CI. 1959).
41. For an alternative theory see Note, 12 Government Contractor 1364 (1970). Also,
the dissenting judge felt the plaintiff's action was one founded on the Armed Services
Procurement Act, 41 U.S.C. §751 (b) (1947), and therefore the court should have granted
relief for both bid preparation costs and lost profits.
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a right to the award of the contract. 2 The decision was criticized on the
grounds that the recognition of such a right in the contractor would severely
limit the discretion of the purchasing authority and would be contrary to
settled judicial practice. 43 While the latter criticism was accurate, the invasion
of executive discretion where all bids were not fairly considered seems
minimal. Although the plaintiff was given standing to sue for his bid preparation costs, denial of lost profits refuted any argument that a disappointed
bidder had a right to the contract.
Perhaps because of the court's concern with fraud, the case has been
further criticized on the theory that it proceeded on tort theory and, therefore, the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction. 4 According to the complaint
not only was the bid of the winning contractor twice as high as plaintiff's
bid, but it also exceeded the costs of six other bidders. The court reasoned
the advertising for bids in such a case would be a sham, and if plaintiff's
45
allegations were true the Government had perpetrated a fraud.
In contrast, there was some praise for the decision to grant standing in
Heyer, since in cases of arbitrary award of contract to one other than the
low bidder a suit accomplishes the same purpose as does a public action.46
It seems more important to consider the nature of the alleged abuse than the
party seeking to rectify it. Ultimately "it is the public who will be the beneficiaries of the suit."4 7 Judicial reluctance was cited as the greatest obstacle
48
confronting the disappointed bidder in vindicating this public interest.
Debarment-The Administrative Procedure Act's Legal Wrong Test
Another line of cases granted the prospective contractor standing where
the government action greatly curtailed his ability to engage in business.
Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell9 involved debarment from
all government jobs for three years. In distinguishing Lukens, the court noted
that the instant plaintiffs were prohibited from competing with others on
an equal basis whereas in Lukens plaintiffs were unable to show an injury
or threat of injury, particularly their own. The plaintiff in Copper Plumbing
derived seventy per cent of its business from government projects. The court
concluded that while the plaintiff did not have a right to contract with the
United States on its own terms, it did have a right not to be invalidly denied
equal opportunity to seek contracts on government projects.5 0 If deprived
42. 70
43.

HARV. L. REv. 564 (1957).

Id.

44. Comment, supra note 37.
45. Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
46. See Note, supra note 17.
47. Id.
48. Id.

49. 290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
50. "In general, courts tend to afford the greatest measure of protection in revocation
or suspension cases. The theory seems to be that here some sort of rights have 'vested' which
may not be taken away without proper procedure. On the other hand, an applicant for
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of this right the plaintiff suffers a legal -wrong, which gives him standing
under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).51
In the later case of Gonzalez v. Freeman52 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the Government could not act arbitrarily against a person to declare him ineligible for government contracts.
Judge (now Justice) Burger, writing for the court, took judicial notice of
"basic facts of economic life" with respect to the severe consequences of
depriving the plaintiff of participation in government procurement. Plaintiff
was given standing for having suffered a legal wrong within the scope of the
Administrative Procedure Act by being debarred in a manner not authorized
or procedurally fair.
Copper Plumbing and Gonzalez were the first cases to use the APA in
granting standing to a disappointed bidder. In both cases the D. C. Circuit
implied Lukens was overruled by the passage of the APA. The new test was
that of suffering a legal wrong as provided by the APA. 53 This was the founda54
tion for radical changes later introduced by the D. C. Circuit.
Changing economic circumstances, coupled with the increase in importance of government business, forced the deviation from the Lukens test of
standing.5 5 That impact was recognized in Gonzalez where the court noted
that the Government could ruin a business by depriving a given individual
of federal procurement contracts. This result alone would seem to justify
granting of a forum for the aggrieved party to seek review of the government's decision. In view of this impact, the argument that regulations56 do
not give a bidder litigable rights to justify standing was no longer deemed
relevant. The consequences of interference with the beneficial business relationship with the Government through illegal application of executive regulations was recognized as sufficient grounds to grant standing. 5 In taking this
position the court appeared to hold that regardless of whether there is a
right to a particular contract, if the Government acts in such a way as to
deprive an individual of an economic interest then such decision may be
58
reviewed by a court

largess is thought to have less at stake and is therefore entitled to less protection." Reich,
supra note I, at 744.
51. "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof." 5 U.S.C. §702 (1970).
52. 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
53. 5 U.S.C. §702 (1970).
54. See text accompanying notes 69-77 inlra.
55. The severity of the economic impact of depriving plaintiff of government patronage was noted by Judge Burger in Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
56. E.g., Federal Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. §§1-1.000 et seq. (1972).
57. Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
58. A deprivation may not be inflicted except in an authorized and procedurally fair
manner. Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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Ultra Vires Action by Official
In Superior Oil v. Udall 9 a disappointed bidder was given standing to
prevent the award of a lease to a company that had submitted an unsigned,
and therefore, unacceptable bid. Plaintiff, the second highest bidder, felt it
was entitled to the award. The court agreed but failed to discuss the issue
of standing. However, the fact that the bidding officer rejected the highest
bid, awarded the contract to the plaintiff, and was reversed by the Secretary
of the Interior may have been deemed dearly ultra vires in view of the
regulations' declaration that the bidding officer and not the Secretary is
authorized to reject all bids not conforming to the regulations. 0
Scanwell

DECISION AND THE DOWNFALL OF

Lukens

Supreme Court's Erosion of the Legal Interest Doctrine
The overruling of Lukens was forecast in the cases eroding the legal
interest concept of standing. In Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities6 the Court
distinguished those cases holding that economic injury from competition is
not a basis for standing by interpreting them to mean "injury" from "lawful
competition."62 It declared that "when the particular statute reflects a legislative intent to protect a competitive interest, the injured competitor has
standing to require compliance with that provision." 63 In Data Processing v.
Camp64 the Court explicitly dismissed the legal interest test as a standard for
standing. Such a test goes to the merits, reasoned the Court, but the question
of standing has nothing to do with the merits. Standing depends upon
whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is reasonably
within the zone of interest of any law. If such is the case and the aggrieved
party can show injury in fact, then the requirements for standing are met.
Hardin and Data Processingmade the APA applicable as a statute within
whose zone of interest aggrieved parties may seek relief. The APA provided
that a person suffering a legal wrong or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action was entitled to judicial review. In interpreting this provision
the Supreme Court stated that unless contrary legislative intent is dearly
shown the APA required judicial review of agency action.65
In Data Processing concurring justices Brennan and White felt the sole
test should be that of injury in fact and the majority's additional test of
falling within a statutory zone of interest to be protected or regulated was

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

409
Id.
390
Id.
Id.

F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir 1969.)
at 1118-19.
U.S. 1 (1968).
at 6.

64. 397 US. 150 (1970).
65. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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wholly unnecessary and inappropriate. 66 This position was supported by the
APA's legislative history in which the Senate Committee declared "this
subsection confers a right of review upon any person adversely affected in
fact by agency action or aggrieved within the meaning of any statute."' 7 Professor Davis has applauded this standard as simpler and closer to the purpose
of a test of standing. 68
Scanwell Laboratoriesv. Shaffer-Lukens No Longer Followed
Finally, Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer G9 completely transformed
the test for standing for disappointed bidders.7 0 The D. C. Circuit, in reversing the lower court's dismissal for lack of standing, reasoned that although
the plaintiff had no right to the contract award he may sue to satisfy the
public interest in having agencies follow applicable regulations controlling
government contracting.7 By allowing such suits, arbitrary and capricious
action may be corrected by one who suffers a resulting injury.72 Such party
would be acting in the public interest as a private attorney general. The
court emphasized, however, that the suit was not to vindicate the plaintiff's
private interest and even if plaintiff could show that the contract was illegally
73
awarded he would have no right to that contract.
The court dismissed Lukens as having been decided in the heyday of the

66. 397 U.S. at 168 (1970).
67. S. Doe. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 212, 276 (1946).
68. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Davis]. Davis feels that the test requiring the asserted interest of the aggrieved
party must be "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question" is analytically faulty. He offers the following illustration: "[I]f a statute authorizes the administrator to regulate from A to M, and
he regulates X without statutory auhorization, X should obviously have standing to challenge, but he does not have under the Court's test, for he cannot show that he is 'to be'
regulated." Id. at 458. In Davis' example X is injured in fact but does not fall within zone
of interest of the particular statute.
69. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
70. The plaintiff, who had submitted the second lowest bid, claimed not only that the
lowest bidder should have been determined to be nonresponsive and unqualified by the
contract office but also that the contract was awarded in violation of the officer's authority.
Id. The Regulations provided that the award be made to the responsible bidder with the
lowest responsive bid. Responsibility is a measure of the capacity of the bidder to do the
job, while responsiveness measures whether the offer made by the bidder meets the government's needs. Consquently, if the lowest bidder is deemed neither responsible nor responsive he is not entitled to the award. 32 C.F.R. pts. 1-39 (1972). See generally R. NAsH & J.
CIBINIc, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW (2d ed. 1969); J. PAUL, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS AND SUBCONTRACTS (1964).
71. This language was generally reminiscent of the Scripps Howard and Sanders Brothers
cases. See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
72. That the plaintiff suffered an injury is needed to satisfy the case or controversy
requirement.
73. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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legal rights doctrine.7 4 Furthermore, the Lukens decision was held to be overruled by the Fulbright Amendment to the Walsh-Healy Act.75 Lukens' statutory repeal and the passage of the APA made the latter applicable:78
In spite of the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet chosen to hold
that the APA applies to all situations in which a party who is in fact
aggrieved seeks review, regardless of a lack of legal right or specific
statutory language, it is dearly the intent of the Act that this should
be the case.
Consequently, unless a contrary legislative intent was shown, one who
demonstrated governmental abuse of discretion was permitted to vindicate
the public interest as a private attorney general under section 10 of the
APA77
Scanwell declared that even one instance of improper deprivation of a
contract was enough to grant standing due a disappointed bidder. This went
further than either Gonzalez or Copper Plumbing, which held that improper
deprivation from competing for all contracts for a specific period of time gave
an aggrieved contractor standing. However, while the latter cases allowed
the contractor to vindicate its own interest, Scanwell granted standing under
the guise of protecting the public interest.
Scanwell Commentary-Pro and Con
Part of the controversy generated by the Scanwell decision arose from the
belief that it had gone beyond Supreme Court guidelines in enunciating a
test for standing.78 The injury-in-fact requirement of Scanwell would eliminate the additional "zone of interest of a statute" test promulgated by the
Supreme Court.70 However, Professor Davis thinks Judge Tamm's opinion in
Scanwell is more in line with the congressional
intent to confer standing
80s
upon "a party who is in fact aggrieved.
Scanwell also evidenced a clear transformation of what the courts considered to be the public interest. Whereas Lukens was primarily concerned
with interference in the orderly operation of the executive branch, Scanwell
expressed the need to have government officials act within the confines of
statutory and administrative guidelines81 Allowing the disappointed bidder

74. Id.
75. 41 U.S.C. §43(a) (1970). The amendment provides in part. "[A]ny interested
person shall have the right of judicial review of any legal question which might otherwise
be raised." See George v. Mitchell, 282 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
76. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F-2d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
77. 5 US.C. §702 (1970).
78. However, later interpretations of Scanwell use the same test as Data Processing. See
Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

79. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
80. See S. Doe. supra note 67.
81. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 68.
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to sue as a result of the alleged illegal activity was viewed as a healthy check
on Government.8 2
However, the critics feared that as a consequence of Scanwell there would
be no logical end to litigation other than eventually running out of bidders
8 3
or the expiration of the cause of action by the statute of limitations.
Opponents also predicted interference with the procurement agencies.8 The
essential question was whether the public interest in having its procurement
funds committed by established rules and disbursed in the most efficient
manner was best served by permitting unsuccessful bidders to litigate the
validity of contract awards. 85
Those who favored the decision, however, saw no prospective flood of
litigation."6 The experience of the state courts, which generally allowed
standing to unsuccessful bidders, failed to show appreciable increase in litigation or delay as a result of granting standing.8 7 Furthermore, Scanwell was
seen as leading to a decrease in the "voluminous litigation about the complexities of standing."8 8 Other governmental agencies that have granted standing to classes such as "consumers" or "anyone adversely affected" have seen
litigation in trickles rather than in floods. 89
THE

PosT-Scanwell EXPERIENCE-THE

PROPHETS OF DooM: WERE THEY RIGHT?

After Scanwell, courts did not hesitate to issue equitable relief to those
bidders adversely affected by alleged illegal government action.9 ° Contract
awards were enjoined pending the resolution of charges of impropriety of
the contracting official's determination. 91 Additionally, in some cases the court
itself resolved the merits of the case and ordered the agency to award the
92
contract to the protesting contractor.
The justification behind granting injunctive relief was based on the

82. Id.
83. Lent, Standing To Sue Leaves the Army Standing Where?, 53 MrLrrARy L. REv. 73,
91 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Lent].
84. See generally Pierson, supra Note 2; Note, 12 Government Contractor 11441 (1970);
Note, 12 Government Contractor 364 (1970).
85. Pierson, supra note 2, at 15.
86. Davis, supra note 68.
87. The vast majority of states allow a bidder to protest an award to a competing
bidder. For a compilation of state statistics on bid protests see Report of the Committee on
Bids and Protests, 4 PUBLIC CONTRACr L. J. 112 (1971).
88. Davis, supra note 68, at 471.
89. An example of such legislation is the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §402 (a) (6)
(1970).
90. See, e.g., Aero Jet Gen. Co. v. Thiokol, 12 Government Contractor 259 (N.D. Cal.
1970); Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Resor, 12 Government Contractor 413 (D.D.C.

1970).
91.

See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 14 Government Contractor

258 (D. D. Cir.

1972).
92. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, 319 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1970); Blount-Barfell-Denehy,

Inc. v. United States, 12 Government Contractor

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1973

286 (D. Okla. 1970).

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 6

19731

FEDERAL CONTRACTOR'S STANDING TO SUE

inadequacy of a remedy at law and the threat of irreparable harm to the
plaintiff.93 Also, it was deemed in the public interest to promote the integrity
of the open and competitive bid process by rendering void any illegal action
by the government official. 94
Which Bidders May Bring Suit?
One of the fears voiced by critics of the liberalized test of standing was
that all unsuccessful bidders would be able to bring suits. 95 In Ballerina Pen
Co. v. Kunzig9 standing was granted, not to an actual, but to a potential
bidder who sued to repeal a contract made by the Government without advertising for bids. The court propagated a three-fold test to be met by the plaintiff seeking review: (1) there must be injury in fact, (2) the interest alleged
must be within a zone of interest of a statute, and (3) there must be no congressional intent of non-reviewability of agency action.97 In order to enjoin
the award of a contract until the bidder's protest was resolved, plaintiff additionally had to allege irreparable harm and assert it was actually entitled to
the award.9s Hence, by the later provision, the courts attempted to eliminate
those bidders with only a remote interest from protesting the award.
Granting or Denying Injunctive Relief
While injunctions were issued in many cases, some courts refused to grant
discretionary equitable relief and advised the plaintiff to pursue his remedies
at law. 99 Except in cases involving long-term performance, injunctions were
seen as unjustifiable and not to be used to interfere with short-term procurement, especially where performance had begun.1 00 Furthermore, an injunction
was not deemed the exclusive remedy in maintaining the integrity of the
bid process, since a declaration of rights' 01 with liability for damages flowing
therefrom would suffice. The Government was free to run the risk of damages
once the court had adjudged the Government to have acted illegally.
The above line of reasoning ignored the fact that often an injunction was

93. Big Four Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Small Business Administration, 12 Government Contractor 2f292 (D. Okla. 1970). For a discussion of the limit of protesting
bidder's damages see text accompanying notes 37-41 supra. The bidder was deemed to suffer
irreparable harm if he is denied profits by the awarding of the contract to another.
94. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, 319 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1970).
95. Lent, supra note 83, at 91.
96. 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1971).
97.

Id.

98. Aero Jet Gen. Co. v. Thiokol, 12 Government Contractor ff259 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
99. M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Simpson Elec. Co. v.
Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970).
100. Simpson Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1970).
101. Id. The court held the plaintiff was the lowest bidder and it was illegal to award
the contract to anyone else. However, once it had determined the respective rights and
liabilities of the Government it refused to enjoin the award.
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the sole sanction applicable to the government official. Moreover, the only
damages a disappointed bidder had been allowed to recover were his bid
preparation costs.' 0 2 If the unsuccessful contractor sought anticipatory profits,
03
the Government would argue that no contractual basis for the suit existed.1
If the bidder attempted to establish a case of breach of an implied contract,
he had no precedent.-4 Even if the contractor could have established the
existence of a contract, express or implied, the Government could have
argued that the plaintiff's damages were uncertain due to the government's
power to terminate for its convenience. 10 5 Consequently, declaratory relief
in the absence of an injunction was likely to provide little or no relief for
the aggrieved bidder and apply no sanction other than a slight reprimand to
the public official.
Judicial Response to the Proliferation of Injunctions
The proliferation of injunctive suits due to the lack of other remedies
forced the courts to develop stricter standards in the resolution of litigation
seeking such relief.10 This problem became especially acute in situations
involving defense contracts. 0 7 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a
showing of "immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage" before a
bidder can obtain a restraining order. 08 The D. C. Circuit has also added the
considerations of equity and "public interest" in adjudicating injunction
cases. 10 9 The court's responsibility was viewed as one of limiting the instances
of unnecessary judicial intervention into the procurement process. 110
In summing up the post-Scanwell experience a year later the D. C. Circuit
Court complained that after an agency's award the losing bidder rushed into
court seeking to halt the procurement and to obtain immediate judicial reconsideration.", The court admitted its lack of expertise when confronted with a
number of technical procurement statutes, regulations, contract provisions
102. E.g., Kcco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. CI. 1970).
103.

Id.

104. One source suggests a disappointed bidder may argue that there is an implied
condition in every bid invitation that the award will go to the lowest responsible bidder.
If the plaintiff is such a bidder then the Government will breach the implied contract

by awarding to someone else. Hence, the plaintiff may sue for damages. Note, 12 Government Contractor 1364 (1970).
105. Under the termination for convenience clause found in all government contracts,
when a contract is so terminated, the contractor may recover damages but no profits. Consequently, the damages of a prospective bidder wrongfully denied the contract would
amount to his bid preparation costs. See generally R. NAsH & J. CmINzc, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW (2d ed. 1969).
106. M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Page Communications Engr's, Inc. v. Resor, 15 CCH Cont. Cas F. 184,154 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
107. Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Resor, 12 Government Contractor 413, rev'd,
15 CCH Cont. Gas. F. 184,154 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
108.

FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (b).

109. M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
110. Id.
Ill.

Id. at 1301.
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and specifications. With this background of the procurement litigation, the
court focused on two interrelated points it deemed important in judicial
determination of emergency challenges to decisions of procurement officials:
(1) courts should not overturn procurement decisions unless no rational
basis is shown for the decision and (2) even if there is no rational basis, in
the presence of overriding public interest, the bidder's need for injunction
should yield to such interest. 1 2 The court concluded that while Scanwell
provided protection against illegal government action, it also imposed concommitant judicial responsibility to exercise the power of injunction with
restraint.
Bond Requirement
In order to prevent frivolous suits, the courts also required the plaintiffs
to post bond before issuing temporary restraining orders. 113 In Page CommunicationsEngineers, Inc. v. Resor"4 the court found that the record raised
substantial questions regarding the legality, propriety, and reasonableness of
the award. However, the court required Page to file a 100,000 dollar bond
"for payment of such costs and damages as may be suffered by any party who
is found to be wrongfully or unlawfully enjoined."'" The court of appeals
reversed the district court's decision granting the injunction"" but gave the
plaintiff an opportunity to seek reinstatement in the lower court."17 Page
did not recontest the decision at the trial court and forfeited its bond." 8
The Government then brought a counterclaim against the plaintiff for an
amount in excess of the bond." 9 The court disallowed the counterclaim in
excess of the bond, and in a later determination ruled no liability was
to be imposed on the plaintiff.20 In returning the plaintiff's bond the court
ruled that the monetary damage the United States Army may have suffered
from the forty-five day delay caused by the injunction was outweighed by the
resulting increase in confidence in the procurement process. Hence, this Page
decision eliminated only the patently frivolous suit by holding that a plaintiff with a meritorious suit would not forfeit his bond though unsuccessful
112. Id.
113. The amount of the bond has covered a wide range; $100,000 was required in Page
Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Resor, 12 Government Contractor 1413 (D.D.C. 1970); while
only $100 was posted in General Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 14 Government Contractor 1258

(D.D.C. 1972).
114. 12 Government Contractor 1413 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. ff80,154
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
115. Id.
116. Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Resor, 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 84,154 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
117. Plaintiff did not recontest the case. Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Resor,
16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 80,313 (D.D.C. 1971).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Resor, 13 Government Contractor 422
(D.D.C. 1971).
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in his bid for an injunction.:'

However, this power of non-forfeiture was
22

reserved for the court's discretion.3

Despite reluctance to grant restraining orders, 123 the courts cannot avoid
issuing such in the current absence of other adequate remedies. 124 The Page
bond requirements provide a difficult standard to apply and should not be
used to measure the responsibility of the protestor's claim.

25

The aggrieved

contractor who has a meritorious claim with a high likelihood of success on
its merits may be unable to post the required bond and therefore be precluded
from his day in court. Consequently, injunction suits could be sought only
by the larger and richer firms to the exclusion of the smaller ones.' 28
Avoiding Injunction Problems by Returning to the Lukens Test of Standing

The denial of injunctive relief in many cases is tantamount to a return
to Lukens. Although a bidder may be granted standing, the total absence of
other than a nominal remedy will be equivalent to a denial of judicial
review. This would defeat the concept of the private attorney general through
which a bidder can protect the public against ultra vires agency actions.2 7
Although some novel and ingenious remedies have been proposed,

28

it is

apparent that declaratory judgments absent injunctive relief will fail to
have much impact on the behavior of government agents. Likewise, failure
to recover anticipatory damages will leave the protesting bidder without an
29
adequate remedy.
Although the question of standing is not to go to the merits of the case,
some critics of Scanwell and its progeny see a denial of standing to disappointed bidders as the only way of restoring efficiency to the procurement
process.'" However, the conferment of standing need not be a necessary
adjunct of an injunction. If it presently is such, that fact is due to the lack
of adequate alternative remedies. It cannot be said that the courts were
121.

However, in reaching its decision the court relied heavily on the fact that the

Army had not presented certain important evidence at the injunction hearing. Therefore,
if a party wishes to recover damages because of wrongful injunction he must at least have
done everything he reasonably can to persuade the court to avoid issuing the injunction. Id.

122. Id.
123.

See, e.g., Wheelabrator, Inc. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306

Cash Register Co. v. Richardson, 13 Government Contractor #109
124.

(D.C. Cir. 1971); National

(D.D.C. 1971).

See, e.g., Northeast Constr. Co. v. Romney, 13 Government Contractor 11268 (D.D.C.

1971).
125.

Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Resor, 15 CCH Cont. Cas, F.

84,154 (D.C.

Cir. 1970).
126. In some cases although a bond has been required the amount has been low. See
cases cited note 113 supra.
127. Note, Standing To Challenge Agency Action by Bidders on Government Contracts,
19 KAN. L. REv. 558 (1971).
128. See text accompanying notes 101-105 supra.
129. 12 Government Contractor 364 (1970). See also Chambers v. United States, 13
Government Contractor ff504 'Ct. Cl. 1971).
130.

See, e.g., Cambell Co. v. Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1971) (dictum).

See also cases cited in 12 Government Contractor ff267 (1972).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1973

15

1973]

Florida Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 6

FEDERAL CONTRACTOR'S STANDING TO SUE

unaware of the sensitive nature of the area they were entering. Scanwell expressly recognized this problem 131 and in Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co.
32
v. Driver the court said:

Mhe mere fact that a party has standing to sue does not entitle him

to render uncertain for a prolonged period of time government contracts which are vital to the functions performed by the sovereign....
Rather than denying access to the courts to all litigants who make
claims of arbitrary and capricious agency action on the ground that
there will be unmeritorious suits from time to time-a process which
also has the effect of barring plaintiffs who have legitimate grievances
-we have determined that considerations of standing have nothing to
do with the merits of the controversy and that the summary judgment
procedure . . . will .

.

. eliminate the frivolous lawsuits ...

The misuse of standing in blocking controversies of the sort involved in
government procurement has been criticized: 133
The law of standing is the wrong tool to accomplish judicial objectives
unrelated to the task of deciding whether a particular interest asserted
is deserving of judicial protection. The courts should avoid hypothetical or remote questions-through the law of ripeness, not through the
law of standing. The courts should decline to enter political areasthrough the law of political questions. .

.

. The courts should limit

themselves to issues "appropriate for judicial determination"-through
the law of case or controversy. .

.

. The courts should avoid taking

over functions of government that are committed to executives or administrators-through the law of scope of review. ... The courts should
virtually stay away from some governmental activities . . . through the

law of unreviewability ...
Thus, the Lukens considerations of public interest and prevention of chaos
were incorrect considerations in deciding whether to grant standing. Withdrawing procurement questions from the courts can be legitimately accomplished not through judicial decisions but through legislative action that
either makes procurement decisions non-reviewable or limits the scope of
review. Consequently, it is readily seen that any problem caused by Scanwell
in the form of delays in procurement should have been avoided by means
other than a misuse of the law of standing.
EXISTING ALTERNATIVES TO ESCAPE FROI

THE JUDICIAL MAZE

The General Accounting Office-Background
Prior to Scanwell the disappointed bidder's principal remedy lay with
the Comptroller General.'- It was the inadequacy of this forum that neces-

181.
182.
138.

Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
483 F.2d 1187, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Davis, supra note 68, at 469,
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sitated a more active role by the judiciary. The goal of procurement legislation is the making of all purchases and contracts by advertising and free
competition. 135 Federal law requires that balances certified by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) upon settlement of public accounts be final and
conclusive upon the executive branch. 1 36 Derivatively, GAO decisions as
rendered by the Comptroller General would in fact decide any controversies
13 7
brought before it as a result of executive agency action.
Disbursing officers have the right to apply to the GAO for advisory opinions. 138 They are also personally liable for awards illegally made. In this
manner the Comptroller General can hold a disbursing officer personally
liable for what the GAO has decided to be an unlawful award. 3 9 Naturally,
a disbursing officer is deterred from acting contrarily to the opinions of the
Comptroller General for fear of being assessed.
This sanction of liability is derived from the Comptroller's power to
disallow credit in the disbursing officers' accounts for any payments pursuant
to an illegal contract.:14 The standard for the GAO is sometimes higher than
that which would apply in court:' 4'
Because of his general concern with proper operation of competitive
bidding process the Comptroller General can make a decision that, as a
matter of procurement policy, awards on contracts should be cancelled
. . . even though they would not be held invalid in court. He is not
confined to the minimal measure of legality but can sponsor and encourage higher standards.
The underlying principle behind this standard is that accepting bids not
complying with advertising specifications is a procedure contrary to law and
therefore not binding on the United States. 42 The province of the Comptroller General is to protect the integrity of the competitive bid process by
insuring that all awards are legally contracted. 43 Strict compliance with the
principle of competitive bidding is, according to the Comptroller General,
infinitely more in the "public interest" than any pecuniary advantage to be
gained by its violation.-4

134. The Comptroller General is the head of the General Accounting Office. The office
was originally intended to nullify only those awards indicating fraud, favoritism, or gross
abuse of authority. Cibinic & Lasken, The Comptroller General, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
349 (1969).
135. 41 U.S.C. §253 (1970).
136. 31 U.S.C. §74 (1970).
137. See Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 134.
138. 31 U.S.C. §82(d) (1970); 36 CoMP. GEN. 513 (1957).
139. 31 U.S.C. §82 (c) (1970); 44 COMP. GE.N. 221 (1964).
140. 31 U.S.C. §82(c) (1970); 44 CoMP. GEN. 221 (1964).
141. John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 440 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
142. 17 CoMP. GEN. 554, 559 (1938).
143. Id. at 557.
144. Id. at 559.
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GAO Procedure
1 45
Because timely action is essential to avoid undue delay of procurement,
the GAO procedure is relatively informal 46 Where the protest is received
before the award of contract the regulations provide that the views of the
Comptroller General should be obtained before award."' This portion was
recently changed to read "award shall not be made" prior to ruling on the
protest unless the agency has furnished the Comptroller General a written
report that enumerates factors not permitting delay. 4 s Such considerations
as urgency, undue delay, or advantage to the Government of a prompt award
have been deemed factors not permitting a delay.4 9 There is no adversary
hearing. The protestor or other interested parties may request a conference
regarding the protest but absent such a request, the matter is disposed of
on the basis of the written briefs. 5 0

Criticism of GAO Procedure
The non-adversary nature of the GAO procedure has made it suspect to
protesting bidders. Its decisions have sometimes been based on policy with
little attention paid to the law. The Comptroller General's concern with the
competitive bid process supposedly justifies him in not being "confined to
the minimal measure of legality."'' 51 Since the Comptroller General looks for
strict compliance with the policy behind the procurement regulations and the
courts allow awards on a more liberal basis, the different decisions between
the two may be due not to differing standards but to different interpretations
of applicable statutes and regulations. 52
Since GAO proceedings are non-adversary, any conflict in the facts is
resolved in favor of the Government. 5 3 Hence, the bidder must base his
case on his adversary's facts. The only way to get effective review of factual
issues is not with the GAO but in the district court.' 5' However, even there
the facts remain unchanged unless found to be arbitrary. Finally, the formal
awarding of the contract makes it unlikely that the protestor will prevail at
the GAO, 55 and his chances decrease proportionately to the amounts expended
145.
protest
known.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Protestors are urged to seek resolution of their complaints with filing of the
not later than five days after the basis for protest is known or should have been
4 C.FR. §20.2 (1972); 32 C.F.R. §2.407-08 (1972).
4 C.F.R. pt. 20 (1972); Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 134.
32 C.F.R. §2.407-08 (b) (2) 1972).
4 C.F.R. §20.4 (1972).
32 C.F.R. §2.407-08 (b) (3) (1972).
4 C.F.R. §20.9 (1972).
John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 440 (1963).
44 CoMP. GEN. 221, 223 (1964).
Crowell, Recognizing the Claim and Where To Take It, in Gov mMNT CONTRAMS
CLAiMs §B (1971) [hereinafter cited as Crowell].
154. Id. at B55.

155. See, e.g., Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Resor, 12 Government Contractor
§413 (D.D.C. 1970).
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by the Government on the project. 1 6 In a protest before award, the GAO
will cancel the award if illegal; when the decision is rendered after the
15
award, the Comptroller General:

7

[M]ay (and frequently does) decide that, although the award was contrary to the rules, full performance under the awarded contract is
nevertheless in the best interest of the Government. Such a decision
is considered to be justified by the Government's need to obtain
prompt performance; the extent to which the contract has been performed ....

In such a case the protestor ends up with a moral victory

only.
Injunctive relief in a district court may be used to preserve the effectiveness of the GAO remedy until the GAO reaches a decision.151 The courts will
require the agency to justify a claim of urgency for the contract with concrete
facts, whereas the GAO will accept as binding a written statement from the
agency head.159
Taking a Protest to the GAO-Advantages and Disadvantages
Statistically the Comptroller General has not been a successful forum for
bidders seeking relief.1 60 Although the number of sustained protests doubled
the year after Scanwell was decided, the success rate has never climbed over
ten per cent.'" The expense of appeal to the Comptroller General may be
high and the protest may span a period of months before a decision is rendered. These two factors coupled with the poor chance of success have driven
62
many bidders to seek judicial relief.1
Certain advantages exist, however, in taking a protest to the Comptroller
General. Formerly, one advantage was the availability of the office for decisions, since pre-Scanwell courts did not hear such matters. 16 3 Presently, in
156. Crowell, supra note 153, at B55.
157. Dembling, Bid Protest Techniques, address before the National Contract Management Ass'n, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1971, reported in Wheelabarator Corp. v. Chafee, 455
F.2d 1306, 1315 n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
158. Aero Jet Gen. Co. v. Thiokol, 12 Government Contractor 11259 (1970). See also
Crowell, supra note 153, at B55.
159. Crowell, supra note 153, at B55, 56.
160.
Formal Decisions
Protests
Protests
Fiscal Year
Rendered
Denied
Sustained
1971
715
641
74
1970
583
548
35
1969
554
520
34
Wheelabarator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306, 1314 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
161. Id.
162. Crowell, supra note 153, B55.
163. Until Scanwell the only remedy the bidder could pursue was within the administrative agencies. However, the bidder need not exhaust his remedy with the GAO before
resorting to the courts. Wheelabarator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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smaller cases, protest to the GAO is less expensive than litigating the issue in
court. New procedures instituted by the GAO in 1972 will contribute to a
speedy disposition of a protest. Whereas the period in which to get a decision
was previously uncertain, presently a decision must be rendered within two
months of filing the protest. 6 4 In instituting the changed procedure the
Comptroller General took notice of the fact that Congress, the courts, and
agencies have come to rely upon bid decisions issued by his office as the
applicable law in procurement. 165 Although the procedures of the GAO have
no effect on the manner of executive agencies' disposition of the matter,
the Comptroller General expressed the hope that:166
[M]ajor contracting agencies in recognition of their responsibilities
toward improvement of the current system of bid procedures will agree
to incorporate into their own regulations pertinent portions of these
procedures and standards applicable to their authority.
In this manner the Comptroller General has taken the initiative to set up a
uniform procedure to settle bid protests at an administrative level. It is foreseeable that instituting procedures for quick and fair decisions will make
the Comptroller General a more acceptable forum than the courts and thus
protestors will seek administrative review in greater numbers. 67 Similarly,
the Comptroller General must eliminate the inherent bias of its procedure
toward government agencies. Most notable of these prejudices is the resolution of factual disputes in favor of the Government and accepting government's contention that urgency of the project requires performance to begin
before the resolution of the protest. 68 The latter point has itself been the
subject of several injunctions169
IMPROVING THE PRESENT SYSTEM

Judicial and Administrative Alternative
Even though Scanwell was decided in 1970 the judiciary has yet to formulate uniform standards in deciding bid protest cases.' 7 0 Standing has been
granted in most cases.17 However, answers to the correlated questions of
whether to grant or deny injunctions are not as definite. The fear of interferring with critical supplies has led to a decreasing use of injunctions in
recent cases." 2 The consequences to a bidder improperly deprived of an
4 C.F.R. §§20.2, .5-.7 (1972).
165. 36 Fed. Reg. 24,791 (1971).
166. Id.
167. See generally Pierson, supra note 2.
168. Crowell, supra note 153.
169. Aero Jet Gen. Co. v. Thiokol, 12 Government Contractor U1259 (1970).
170. See Lent, supra note 83, at 90.
171. There are still a few cases holding that Lukens is good law and not granting
standing. See, e.g., Gary Aircraft v. Seamans, 14 Government Contractor 267 (D. Tex. 1972).
172. See text accompanying notes 106-112 supra.
164.
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award has also not been corrected. Although the courts have attempted to
balance the interests of contractor, Government, and public the results have
not always been equitable.17 3 Furthermore, using a sliding scale of standards
according to the urgency of the procurement has itself raised questions as
to the definition of "urgent."
Once standing is granted, the courts have been left with a situation upon
whose resolution in favor of the plaintiff an injunction naturally followed.
The inevitability of this result is dependent on the availability of other
remedies and, to date, there is no other remedy. This predicament is caused
by the sovereign's refusal to grant monetary damages to bidders improperly
deprived of a contract.
Administratively, there have been overtures to streamline and improve
protest procedures to relieve the courts from the number of cases currently
brought before them. 74 The revision of GAO procedures and the accompanying suggestion that procurement agencies adopt a similar procedure should
17 5
eliminate much criticism posed by bidders using the administrative forums.
The power of the GAO in this area can lead to better procedures for all
administrative decisions in procurement. 7 6 Introduction of fundamental adversary procedures and provision to the protestor of an opportunity to
answer government charges will also make the administrative forum more
palatable to contesting bidders, thereby relieving the courts from these
matters.

77

If the Comptroller General deems it necessary, he may adopt the due
process safeguards of the Administrative Procedure Act,'7 s which in turn
would serve to limit the scope of review by the courts. If the protesting bidder
is able to assert his claim in administrative proceedings, the function of the
judiciary would be reduced to solely determining the reasonableness of the
agency's decision.
Legislative Options
Legislation may help improve the present system in various ways. 7 9 One
alternative entails the creation of a new administrative board to review bid
protest cases. 80° Another suggestion is to grant the Court of Claims jurisdiction with authority to award the aggrieved contractor monetary damages
beyond bid preparation costs.' 8' A third suggested option is to eliminate

173. See, e.g., Page Communications Engr's. Inc. v. Resor, 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. ff84,154
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
174. See text accompanying notes 164-169 supra.
175. See Crowell, supra note 153.
176. See Cibinic & Lasken, supra note 134.
177. See Crowell, supra note 153.
178. 7 U.S.C. §702 (1970).
179. See generally Pierson, supra note 2.
180. See Lent, supra note 83, Pierson, supra note 2.
181. Pierson, supra note 2.
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interference with the functioning of the procurement process by either committing bid decisions to agency discretion and make them nonreviewable or
82
to require a very high bond to discourage suits for restraining orders.
Establishment of a new administrative body may be accomplished by consolidating the existing processes in the executive branch with the Comptroller
General. The decision from these agencies would be reviewable by the courts,
but the scope of review would be a certiorari review for reasonableness. The
obvious shortcoming of this suggestion is that it would be an unwelcome
and expensive addition to the already proliferating government bureaucracy.
Suits for injunctive relief, which is the major problem caused by allowing
standing, may be alleviated by allowing money damages to bidders improperly denied a contract. Legislation permitting only monetary damages
based on anticipated profits would eliminate the results of nullifying a
contract. Despite the extra cost to the Government in paying the fine, this
solution may prove less expensive than paying the cost of delay incurred by
the contractor awarded the contract. Second, this procedure would allow the
procurement process to continue unhampered. This alternative would at the
same time vindicate the public interest by providing sanctions for unlawful
government action.
In cases involving prospective bidders, the speculative nature of damages
poses an additional problem. 83 Nevertheless, the class of plaintiffs exemplified
by Ballerina Pen may be seriously harmed because of government foreclosure
of the opportunity to compete for many contracts. 84 Rather than providing
for anticipated profits, which would be difficult to prove, a schedule of fines
may be set up to compensate the contractor. Those contractors for whom court
litigation is prohibitively costly should be able to recover damages at the
administrative level. 8 5 This may be done by authorizing the agency to render
damages against the Government up to a specified amount.
The current problems may also be alleviated by regression to a preScanwell stand. One method would commit procurement decisions completely
to agency discretion.""' A variation would be to dictate non-reviewability
according to the impact of court interference with government functioning.
Under this alternative the courts would not interfere at all with vital contracts but would review only those matters with small impact. These suggestions, however, would leave the question of reviewability at the court's discretion and would not lend greatly to predictability. Another method of
achieving judicial non-interference with procurement is requiring a high
standard of proof and allowing reversal of government action only if such
action is palpably illegal. 87
182. Lent, supra note 85; Pierson, supra note 2.
183. See, e.g., Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
184. Id.

185. See Pierson, supra note 2.
186. Id.

187. "Requiring the plaintiffs to meet an inordinately high standard of proof . . .
require[s] the court to reach conclusions ... almost totally independent of the legal merits
of the case before them." Pierson, supra note 2, at 43.
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Finally, requiring posting of high bonds is seen as a way of discouraging
injunctions. However, this would seem unfair to small contractors unable to
post bond. Additionally, high bonds might deter some suits patently in the
public interest because the contractor might not be willing to "gamble" by
posting bond. This requirement would then raise a question as to when a
contractor will forfeit bond. 88
CONCLUSION

Federal procurement represents a large source of political patronage used
to repay debts or to win votes in a particular district by the incumbent.
Consequently, the competitive bidding process is sometimes abused by handing out favors from the proverbial "pork barrel." Since prosecution of a particular official for non-compliance with procurement regulations is rare, an
action by a competing contractor who might be more qualified than the
winner could effectively protect the public interest. Hence, the theory of
standing espoused in Lukens is both naive and contrary to the public
welfare. 18 9
Accepting the beneficial aspects of Scanwell as providing a check on government discretion, the next goal of the Government should be the elimination of delays that can be caused under the status quo. Injunctions are often
inevitable due to a lack of alternative remedies. However, providing a disappointed contractor with monetary damages will check arbitrary government action while also avoiding much of the criticism posed as a result of
enjoining government procurement. To this end, legislation allowing damages
to a disappointed bidder, preferably based on a percentage of his lost profits,
is needed. In cases of patent bad faith by the government official or collusion
or fraud, the plaintiff contractor should be allowed to enjoin the performance
of the contract. Alternatively, a better administrative process could decide
protests before the award of the contract and eliminate many of the problems
endemic to enjoining contracts where performance has begun. However, a
return to the Lukens standard of denying standing through legislation or

188. Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Resor, 13 Government Contractor f422
(D.D.C. 1971).
189. Reich, who views property as a buffer between the individual and the state,
believes giving standing to those whose "largess" is improperly interfered with by government will help stop the encroachment of the state into the lives of its citizens. "Wealth or
value is created by culture and by society; it is culture that makes a diamond valuable and
a pebble worthless. Property, on the other hand, is the creation of law. A man who has
property has certain legal rights with respect to an item of wealth; property represents a
relationship between wealth and its 'owner.' Government largess is plainly 'wealth,' but it is
not necessarily 'property'. . . . When . . . the government take[s] over 'property' the Constitution requires that just compensation be paid to the owner. But when largess is
revoked . . . the holder ordinarily receives no compensation. . . . As we move toward a
welfare state, largess will be an ever important form of wealth. And largess is a vital link
in the government and private sides of society. It is necessary, then, that largess begin to
do the work of property." Reich, supra note I, at 739, 745, 778.
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judicial decision would be a regretable step backward in protecting the public
purse from inefficient and illegal disposition of funds.1 90
ATILLA ILKSON

190. "The grant, denial, revocation, and administration of all types of government
largess should be subject to scrupulous observance of fair procedure. Action should be open
to hearing and contest, and based upon a record subject to judicial review. The denial of
any form of privilege or benefit on the basis of undisclosed reasons should no longer be
tolerated." Reich, supra note 1, at 783.
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